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Abstract: The author examines the nexus between international law and the concept 
of human security that emerged in the 1990s. The article proceeds in three parts. Part 
one outlines the concept of human security, its genesis and contents. Part two exam-
ines the nexus between human security and international law and briefly considers the 
most representative aspects of international law, including international jurisprudence, 
that, in the author’s opinion, reflect human security imperatives. Finally, conclusions 
provide answers to the questions posed and indicate the increased value of the human 
security concept. The questions read as follows: How can human security strengthen 
international actions (actions based on international law)? Where in international law 
is human security reflected? In other words, what aspects of international law reflect 
a human security-centered approach? What is the role of international law in human 
security? Taking all this into account, what is the added value of adopting the concept 
of human security? This article is inevitably interdisciplinary, as it combines the per-
spectives of international law and international relations.
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1. Introduction
Sometimes legal norms and policy concepts may reinforce and com-plement each other. This is the case for human security (a policy con-
cept) and international law (which is of course a matter of legal norms). 
Human security may be treated as “a protective tool within the interna-
tional law of human rights” (Estrada-Tanck, 2017) as its precepts are most 
clearly visible there. Human security places human beings at its center 
of analysis and actions and, as such, it coincides with the process of the 
gradual humanization of public international law described by Antonio 
A. Cançado Trindade in his important book International Law for Hu-
mankind. Towards a New Jus Gentium (2010) or by Theodor Meron in his 
equally influential book The Humanization of International Law (2006). 
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Accordingly, in the second half of the 20th century and at the beginning 
of the 21st century, the evolution of international law has moved towards 
a more clear focus on the human person and humankind (Cançado Trin-
dade, 2010, p. 394).1
Basic considerations of humanity permeate different areas of interna-
tional law such as international human rights law, international humani-
tarian law and refugee law (Cassese, 2005, p. 396). Various issues and 
problems are governed by international law, problems that directly af-
fect human beings and their rights, needs and ability to survive: arms, 
proliferation of light and small weapons, disarmament, terrorism, failed/
fragile states, armed conflicts, international crimes and serious violations 
of human rights, poverty and environmental degradation. All of these is-
sues constitute threats to human security. Recent years saw the adoption 
of fundamental treaties addressing at least some of these problems. Here, 
one should list such agreements as the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Statute of 1998, the International Convention on the Protection of All Per-
sons from Enforced Disappearance of 2006, the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions of 2008, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 20132 and the Paris 
Climate Agreement of 2015. As Barbara von Tigerstrom (2007, p. 61) 
emphasizes in this context, “[o]ne of the most important examples of the 
way the law can be used as an instrument for ensuring human security is 
the establishment of international criminal tribunals and especially the 
International Criminal Court.”
The aim of this paper is to analyze the mutual relationship between 
the concept of human security and international law. In order to achieve 
that goal it is necessary to answer a few basic questions: How can human 
security strengthen international actions (actions based on international 
law)? Where in international law is human security reflected? In other 
words, what aspects of international law reflect a human security-centered 
approach? What is the role of international law in human security? Taking 
all this into account, what is the added value of adopting the concept of 
human security?
The research methods used include an institutional-legal analysis and 
critical examination of the literature. The first method serves to examine 
1 Anne Peters (2009, p. 540) argues that “[…] the humanization of sovereignty 
has shifted the focus from rights of states to the needs of humans and has thus pro-
moted a significant evolution of international law.”
2 For more details see also: Yihdego, 2007; Fleck, 2013; Kellman, 2013–2014; 
Worster, 2014–2015.
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the legal texts, documents and international jurisprudence, while the lat-
ter will analyze the relevant literature, mostly in the fields of international 
relations and international law.
The article proceeds in three parts. Part one outlines the concept of 
human security, its genesis and contents. Part two examines the nexus, 
including the differences, between human security and international law 
and briefly considers the most representative aspects of international law, 
including international jurisprudence, that in my opinion reflect human 
security imperatives. Finally, in Concluding remarks, I will try to answer 
the questions posed and indicate the added value of the concept of human 
security. This article is inevitably interdisciplinary, combining aspects of 
international law and international relations.
2. The genesis and concept of human security  
and its normative antecedents
Traditionally, security pertained to relations between states and was 
of a predominantly military character. This meant that an individual had, 
first and foremost, obligations of service towards the state, for example 
as a member of the army. Threats to security came from other states, for 
example in the form of external aggression. After the end of the Cold 
War, states became more secure. This, however, was not necessarily true 
with reference to their nationals. New threats to the security of the latter 
emerged, which were of a non-military character. Ramesh Thakur (2006, 
p. 73) notices that “[t]o many poor people in the world’s poorest countries 
today, the risk of being attacked by terrorists or with weapons of mass 
destruction is far removed from the pervasive reality of the so-called soft 
threats – hunger, lack of safe drinking water and sanitation and endemic 
diseases – that kill millions every year, far more than the so-called ‘hard’ 
or ‘real’ threats to security” (see also the Millennium Development Goals 
Report, 2015, p. 7). In the 1990s, a new security paradigm emerged, 
namely that of human security (on the historical roots of the doctrine of 
human security see Peou, 2014). However, this did not mean that military 
security lost its leading role. Nowadays, strong, stable and democratic 
states remain the best guarantors of national and international security, 
including the security of their own citizens (Peou, 2014, p. 1). One of the 
most important contributions to the emergence of the concept of human 
security was the influential work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap 
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de Wilde Security. A New Framework for Analysis, published in 1998, 
in which the authors indicated five security sectors and corresponding 
threats: “the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the 
political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and 
recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, produc-
tion, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective 
identity; and the environmental sector is about the relationships of human 
activity and the planetary biosphere” (p. 7). That book marked the new 
approach to national security, which questioned the pivotal significance 
of military level of security (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998, p. 1).
The novelty of the idea of human security lies in its innovative ap-
proach aimed at holistically and in a complex manner addressing the 
sources of threats affecting people all over the world. Those threats are 
of global reach and consequence, and very diverse in nature (Bruderlein, 
2001, p. 358). Human security focuses on humans as the beneficiaries and 
– at the same time – providers of security. It takes into account the needs 
of and opportunities for human populations. According to the precepts of 
this concept, armed conflicts are rooted in social and political exclusion, 
structural violence and inequality. In order to ensure human security, it 
is not sufficient only to build institutions of liberal democracy and a free 
market, but also to assure the social protection of citizens. Accordingly, 
a strong state is capable of providing its citizens with the means to sur-
vive and have a decent standard of living, as well as being capable of 
meeting their other basic social needs (Research Brief. Towards a Human 
Security…, 2010, pp. 3–5). This was strongly emphasized by Judge An-
tonio A. Cançado Trindade in his separate opinion stated in the ICJ Advi-
sory Opinion on the Accordance with international law of the unilateral 
declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo: “[t]he basic lesson is 
clear: no State can use territory to destroy the population. Such atrocities 
amount to an absurd reversal of the ends of the State, which was created 
and exists for human beings, and not vice-versa” (2010, para. 176).
Human security was intended to provide answers to new threats and 
challenges. Its main focus is on the human being, who is placed at the 
center of debate, analysis, policy and interest. Accordingly, human beings 
are important, they are the ultimate point of reference for all security ef-
forts, and a state is an instrument for ensuring their welfare. Elementary 
goods and values protected in the framework of human security, including 
life and personal security, may be threatened not only by external aggres-
sion but also by internal factors. The human security concept is rooted 
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in the human rights tradition that is supposed to protect individuals from 
abuse at the hands of their own state and – on the other hand – in the con-
cept of development, which envisions a state as a necessary instrument 
of promoting human security (Thakur, 2006, p. 72; Gomes, Gaspar n.d.). 
However, to increase human security, concrete actions must be taken not 
only by states but also by the individuals themselves and their collectives. 
In this regard, the latter are also subjects of human security (Szpak, 2015, 
pp. 121–122).
The concept of human security has its roots on one hand in the famous 
Declaration by President Roosevelt in 1941 (Annual Message to Congress 
– Four Freedoms Speech), in which he explicitly mentioned freedom 
from want and fear together with freedom of expression and religion, and 
his State of the Union Address of January 11, 1944, and on the other in 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Universal 
Declaration states in the preamble that “recognition of the inherent dig-
nity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The 
same statement is included in the preamble to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Hence, the normative antecedents 
of human security may be found in the first universal legal sources of in-
ternational human rights law (Szpak 2015, p. 122; Szpak, 2016, p. 373). 
Thus, the concept is unavoidably linked to the United Nations itself.
For the first time the notion of human security was expressly intro-
duced in the 1993 Human Development Report published by the United 
Nations Development Program. It was included as one of the five pillars of 
the global order focused on humans (Human Development…,1993, p. 2). 
Then, in the 1994 Human Development Report, the concept as a whole 
was developed considerably. In the Report it was indicated that “[t]he 
threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national. 
They are becoming global: with drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, and 
nuclear proliferation. Global poverty and environmental problems respect 
no national border. Their grim consequences travel the world” (Human 
Development…, 1994, p. 2). Human security embraces two fundamental 
components – freedom from fear and freedom from hunger (ibid., p. 24). 
Freedom from fear is a narrower approach to human security and as such 
it encompasses freedom from violence, armed conflicts and external mili-
tary aggression, whereas freedom from want represents a broader approach 
in accordance to which personal, community, economic, environmental, 
food and health securities are emphasized. Hence, the first concentrates 
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on the politico-military realm, including lack of violence, and the latter 
concentrates on the socio-economic development of people and their liv-
ing conditions. In this article, human security is construed in the broader 
sense, in the same way as in the 1994 Human Development Report, as will 
be indicated below (Tajabakhsh, Chenoy, 2007, pp. 40–49).
Human security contains seven categories: economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, personal security, com-
munity security and political security (Human Development…, 1994, pp. 
24–25). Consequently, human security is, and in order to be a novel and 
effective concept must be, understood broadly – in a holistic and integra-
tive manner (Szpak, 2015, pp. 122–123; Szpak, 2016, p. 374). The 1994 
Human Development Report also considers the most serious threats to 
human security in the 21st century and mentions among them unchecked 
population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive in-
ternational migration, environmental degradation, drug production and 
trafficking and international terrorism (Human Development…, 1994, 
p. 34).
Afterwards, numerous UN organs and other international organiza-
tions acted as a forum for debate, expression and the promotion of alter-
native concepts of security. UN organs and agendas such as UNHCR and 
the Secretary General took the new concept into account in their actions. 
Hence, the UN became a key instrument for legitimizing the new concept 
of security (Thakur, 2006, p. 91). For example, in 2003, the Commission 
on Human Security published its Human Security Now report; in 2004, 
the concept of human security was given prominent place in the High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A more secure world: 
our shared responsibility; in the same year, the European Union also 
contributed to the shaping and disseminating of the concept of human 
security by issuing its A Human Security Doctrine for Europe; in 2005 
a Report of the Secretary General In Larger Freedom: towards develop-
ment, security and human rights for all (para. 133) and the World Summit 
Outcome (para. 143), were published.
Bearing in mind all of the above considerations and various defini-
tions of human security given by different bodies, one should try to define 
human security. Human security is a state and process that aims at the 
certainty of survival and existence and the opportunity for development, 
as well as meeting the elementary needs of humans. This is a process, 
because security is not given forever; it has evolved and fluctuated, and 
constant efforts must be taken in order to maintain it. It is important to em-
ŚSP 1 ’19 Human security, human rights and international law... 177
phasize that the achievement of human security for some cannot deprive 
others of the same security, as this concept is universal and recognizes no 
territorial boundaries. As a concept that should be implemented in prac-
tice, human security places human beings and their needs center stage. 
The results of activities and projects undertaken within the framework of 
human security should contribute to the global prosperity of all people. 
National and international security is instrumental for human security, 
thus ensuring the former should ultimately serve people. For that reason, 
human security should not be regarded as contradicting national security 
and should not replace it. Those two dimensions of security are comple-
mentary (Thakur, 2006, p. 89). From the perspective of human security, 
national security is valuable, but treated as one of many tools used for 
promoting individuals’ interests (Kutz, 2009, pp. 233–234; Szpak, 2015, 
p. 124; Szpak, 2016, p. 375). As well as states, other subjects are respon-
sible for or may contribute to human security, most of all international 
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, and the individuals 
themselves, who are treated as both subjects and objects (providers and 
beneficiaries) of human security simultaneously. The achievement of hu-
man security requires cooperation between an interconnected network of 
subjects: states, international organizations with the primary role of the 
United Nations, and the private and public sector at the local, national, re-
gional and international levels (Human Security in Theory and Practice. 
An Overview…, p. 14; McRae, Hubert, 2001, p. 236).
3. Reflections of human security from international law
Security is an essential value for every human, and ensuring security 
is a task and aim of all legal systems. In this context, many questions 
about the importance of international law for human security have been 
raised. The law is the main tool used to ensure security. It is also worth 
noting that the focus on human beings is noticeable in several areas of 
international law, for instance in refugee law, international humanitarian 
law and, naturally, in human rights law (von Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 65). All, 
or almost all, of the threats to human security are regulated by interna-
tional law to a greater or lesser extent. As such, it may be treated as a tool 
for ensuring human security. Human security has as its normative basis in 
human rights, and therefore international human rights law is extremely 
important for this concept. As noted by Stéphanie Ménard, the concept of 
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human security links security with human rights and development (Mé-
nard, 2008, p. 10).
Among the most important international law treaties and instruments 
aimed at ensuring international peace and security is the United Nations 
Charter. It is probably the most clear example of law expressing directly 
a specific concept of security (namely collective security), but the prin-
ciples, rules, and institutions of international law provide the resources and 
environment to ensure security in less direct ways. Regarding human rights, 
the concept of human security does not constitute a set of legal norms, but 
an instrument which can be used, among others, to interpret and develop 
legal norms. Taking into account the conclusion that international law is 
a tool to ensure human security, and human security can be used to interpret 
and develop legal norms, the relationship of human security and interna-
tional human rights law is actually an interaction. Those two complement 
and reinforce each other. Human security is narrower than human rights, as 
it focuses on the most basic or fundamental human rights necessary for the 
survival of individuals and their human dignity. It does not include more 
advanced human rights, which accrue to a person when he or she is safe.
International law and international human rights law govern most of 
the issues discussed within the framework of human security. International 
law is – alongside international organizations – one of the most important 
institutions shaping international relations and security. Institutionaliza-
tion – including through international law – protects the international or-
der by contributing to the mitigation of tensions in international relations. 
International law upholds sovereign equality and thereby protects primar-
ily small and weak states that do not have at their disposal significant 
military or economic power (Polcikiewicz, 2012, p. 105). Ramesh Thakur 
(2006, pp. 361–362) argues that
[l]aw thereby mediates relations between the rich and the poor, 
the weak and the powerful, by acting as a constraint on capricious 
behaviour and setting limits on the arbitrary exercise of power. 
It is our one big safety net for civilised conduct. Conversely, the 
greater the gap between power and authority, the closer we are to 
anarchy, to the law of the jungle where might equals right, and 
the greater is the legitimacy deficit. Equally, the greater the gap 
between power and justice in world affairs, the greater is the inter-
national legitimacy deficit.
In this way, international law sets the standards of conduct for its subjects 
and reflects the values desired by the international community. Interna-
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tional law thus contributes to international security. It should be pointed 
out that one of the many functions of international law is the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, which directly impacts international security. As 
Tadeusz Jasudowicz rightly notes, all laws – be they national or interna-
tional – are based upon the dignity of the human person and should serve, 
more or less directly, its protection. Laws should be evaluated by the 
measure of human dignity, and with this dignity in mind they should be 
adopted and implemented (Jasudowicz, 2015, p. 85). Good international 
law, from the time of Cicero to the philosophers of the Enlightenment and 
to Immanuel Kant and his successors, was seen as one of the important 
preconditions of peace between nations. Today, it is still the basic element 
of the infrastructure of peace (Balcerowicz, 2002, p. 55). Barbara von Ti-
gerstrom (2007, p. 65) rightly stated that “the concept of human security 
cannot simply be equated with any particular area of the law. However, 
one would expect to find some important parallels between the concept of 
human security and the legal recognition and protection of human rights 
in international law.”
Sometimes sovereignty is seen as an obstacle to human security, 
mirroring the tension between human rights and state sovereignty (Re-
isman, 1990, pp. 866–876; Nagan, Hammer, 2004–2005, pp. 141–187). 
Principles in international law, such as the sovereign equality of states 
(Art. 2.1 of the UN Charter) and the prohibition of the threat and use of 
force (Art. 2.4 of the UN Charter) protects the state, its territorial integ-
rity, independence and central position in the international arena. This 
may suggest that national security should have priority over human secu-
rity (von Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 64). However, as already mentioned, those 
two concepts are rather – or ideally should be – complementary and not 
contradictory. The same argument applies to the tension between human 
rights and sovereignty. Keeping this in mind, human security serves as 
“a framework or impetus for rethinking key aspects of the international 
legal order, especially state sovereignty” (von Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 63). 
Within this line of argument, as Anne Peters brilliantly claimed, the fun-
damental international law category of sovereignty has been completely 
humanized, because human rights are not merely a normative limit of its 
exercise but its very content and essence. Sovereignty is qualified and 
determined by ‘humanity’ and is of value only as much as it respects hu-
man rights (Peters, 2009, p. 514). Hence, sovereignty needs justification, 
rooting it in a higher axiological order as – on its own – sovereignty is an 
‘empty vessel’ (Peters, 2009, p. 518). This justification for sovereignty 
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is to be found in the ‘humanity’ encompassing “the principle that public 
power must serve human rights, interests, and needs” as an axiological 
foundation of a legal system (Peters, 2009, p. 518). Still quoting Anne Pe-
ters: “[i]t has become clear that the normative status of sovereignty is de-
rived from humanity, understood as the legal principle that human rights, 
interests, needs, and security must be respected and promoted, and that 
this humanistic principle is also the telos of the international legal system. 
Humanity is the A and Ω of sovereignty” (Peters, 2009, p. 514). It seems 
that such an interpretative nexus between sovereignty and humanity is 
reflected in the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) concept (Responsibility 
to Protect. Report…, 2001; Stahn, 2007, pp. 99–120; Popovski, 2010, pp. 
204–219). R2P and humanitarian intervention are sometimes regarded as 
“human security in action” (von Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 96; on humanitar-
ian intervention see also: Holzgrefe, Keohane, 2003; Welsh, 2004). But, 
as the same author rightly argues, “[p]roperly understood, R2P does not 
cover all human security issues, but its application is limited to extreme, 
conscience-shocking cases of mass atrocities” (Peters, 2009, p. 523). She 
concludes that the old concept of sovereignty has been thoroughly trans-
formed by the much newer concept of human rights. This transformation 
reflects the shift in our perception of the nature of the political order that 
was caused by the emergence of the human rights discourse. This led to 
a paradigm shift, as traditional relations between the state and the citizen 
were reversed: the fundamental rights of citizens are considered a priority 
(Peters, 2009, p. 543). Peters claims that “sovereignty has already been 
relegated to the status of a second-order norm which is derived from and 
geared towards the protection of basic human rights, needs, interests, and 
security” (2009, p. 544). Lauterpacht also claimed that “[f]undamental 
human rights are rights superior to the law of the sovereign State … [and 
must lead to the] consequent recognition of the individual human being 
as a subject of international law” (McCorquodale, 2003, p. 302). Respect 
for human rights is an obligation of every state, flowing from the principle 
of sovereignty. Sovereign states are, first and foremost, instruments to 
ensure human security, which includes respect for basic human rights. 
They should serve the prosperity of their populations, not hide behind the 
curtain of the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty.
As mentioned in the beginning of this article, basic or elementary 
considerations of humanity permeate different areas of international law. 
They are also recognized in the jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugosla-
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via (ICTY) (Cançado Trindade, 2010, p. 393). The most important judg-
ments merit attention, as they indicate clear expressions of the elementary 
considerations of humanity, which may be treated as the normative foun-
dation of human security. As such, this foundation may, and in some cases 
does, even pre-date the emergence of the concept of human security. But 
there is nothing extraordinary in new concepts being rooted in earlier 
normative precepts and then gradually being shaped and developed to 
reach a mature form. For the first time the ICJ evoked “the elementary 
principles of humanity” in the Corfu Channel case (1949, p. 22). The 
same pertained to the ICJ judgment in the Nicaragua case (1986, pp. 112, 
114) when the Court stated – referring to the Corfu Channel case – that 
Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 reflected “elementary 
considerations of humanity.” In the Genocide advisory opinion of 1951 
the ICJ mentioned “the special characteristics of the Genocide Conven-
tion” stating that
the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are 
recognized by civilized nations as binding on states, even with-
out any conventional obligation. A second consequence is the 
universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of 
the co-operation required “in order to liberate mankind from such 
an odious scourge” (Preamble to the Convention). The Genocide 
Convention was therefore intended by the General Assembly and 
by the contracting parties to be definitely universal in scope (p. 
23).
Finally, in the Legality of the Threat or Use of the Nuclear Weapons ad-
visory opinion, the ICJ referred to “the overriding consideration of hu-
manity” that permeates the principles and rules of international law of 
armed conflict (Legality of…, 1996, para. 95). Apart from the ICJ, some 
significant conclusions or aspects of the jurisprudence of the ICTY (Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) should be empha-
sized. For example, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY stated in the Tadić 
Interlocutory Appeal of 1995 that:
the impetuous development and propagation in the international 
community of human rights doctrines, particularly after the adop-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, has 
brought about significant changes in international law, notably in 
the approach to problems besetting the world community. A State-
sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by 
a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Ro-
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man law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is cre-
ated for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in 
the international community as well (para. 97).
In the Kupreskić case (2000, para. 527) – interpreting the Martens clause 
– the ICTY argued that
[i]n the light of the way States and courts have implemented it, this 
Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian 
law may emerge through a customary process under the pressure 
of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, 
even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other ele-
ment, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of 
the imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to 
be the decisive element heralding the emergence of a general rule 
or principle of humanitarian law3.
Finally, in the Čelebići case of 2001, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
– following the ICJ judgment in the Nicaragua case – ruled that Com-
mon Article 3 reflects “elementary considerations of humanity” (Delalić, 
Mucić, Delić, Landzo, 2001, para. 140).
Some of those decisions may be seen as historical precedents to hu-
man security, as they predate the emergence of this concept, and still oth-
ers may be regarded as judicial expressions of the relationship between 
human security and the principle of humanity. This relationship requires 
a few comments. As mentioned, basic or elementary considerations of hu-
manity permeate different areas of international law such as international 
human rights law or international humanitarian law. Those branches of 
law have as their common aim the protection of the life, health and dig-
nity of human beings, hence their implementation contributes to the re-
alization of human security. The principle of humanity is rooted in the 
concept and common experience of sameness, meaning that all people 
are part of the human race and as such all deserve respect for their human 
rights and dignity (Fast, 2016, p. 113). This experience also constitutes 
the underpinnings of the concept of human security. The principle of hu-
manity is of a normative character, although it is rather general in scope. 
Its concretization is expressed in particular norms of international law, 
especially human rights law and international humanitarian law.
3 This argument has been criticized in legal literature. See for example: Kalshoven, 
2003. On the Martens clause see: Pustogarov, 1999; Ticehurst, 1997; Meron, 2006, 
pp. 16–29.
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Finally, I would like to mention one factor that may bind together 
international law, human rights and human security – that of solidar-
ity. International solidarity should be the basis for a new international 
order. According to Makarewicz (2006, p. 743), the concept of solidar-
ity should be regarded as one of the fundamental organizing principles 
of the international community. It should be the basis for the moral and 
legal organization of the world order in the era of globalization. Mac-
donald (1996, pp. 259–260) claims that solidarity constitutes, most of 
all, the principle of cooperation, which is identified as the goal of all 
the state actions, common as well as separate, which is to the benefit of 
all states, and at least does not seriously endanger the interests of other 
states. In his opinion, solidarity as a principle of international law pro-
vides a context for “meaningful cooperation that goes beyond the con-
cept of a global welfare state; on the legal plane, it reflects and reinforces 
the broader idea of a world community of interdependent states.” As 
such, solidarity is connected to other values present in international law 
and the international community, such as human rights, peace, security, 
sustainable development and justice. All of them may be achieved on 
the basis of solidarity. It should be the guiding principle in international 
relations. Anne Peters refers to solidarity in the context of R2P, the latter 
being treated as “a kind of social contract between the state and the in-
ternational community as a whole. The state commits itself to protect its 
population in exchange for respect of its sovereignty by the community. 
[…] This principle is apt to bolster populations’ claims for humanitarian 
assistance by other states” (Peters, 2009, pp. 535–536). In 2013, the UN 
Human Rights Council adopted resolution 23/12 Human rights and in-
ternational solidarity where it called upon “the international community 
to promote international solidarity and cooperation as an important tool 
to help to overcome the negative effects of the current economic, finan-
cial and climate crises, particularly in developing countries” (point 5). It 
also reaffirmed that “international solidarity is not limited to internation-
al assistance and cooperation, aid, charity or humanitarian assistance; it 
is a broader concept and principle that includes sustainability in interna-
tional relations, especially international economic relations, the peace-
ful coexistence of all members of the international community, equal 
partnerships and the equitable sharing of benefits and burdens” (point 
2). Accordingly, international solidarity should be the pillar upon which 
international cooperation, humanitarian and developmental aid should 
be based, and as such contribute to the human security. International soli-
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darity should also lead to all people universally benefiting from human 
security, not some at the cost of others.
4. Concluding remarks
The concept of human security has been criticized for its lack of a uni-
versally accepted definition and for weakness of analysis. Most of the 
definitions focus on basic human rights, but there is no consensus on the 
types of threats to individuals that should be included in the definition. 
The most serious complaint concerning the concept of human security 
refers to its overly extensive and vague scope. This makes it of little use 
for political decision-makers (von Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 36; Paris, 2001, 
p. 88). This claim, however, does not seem to be accurate, because indi-
vidual issues falling under the ‘umbrella of human security’ are very spe-
cific and measurable problems, such as international terrorism, migration, 
environmental threats, etc. One may also add that the new term ‘human 
security’ is treated as an analytical tool allowing a more adequate recog-
nition of the global situation, the identification of needs and the develop-
ment of solutions for their more effective fulfillment. In this context Alex 
Bellamy notes that practice of human security (hence, concrete actions 
undertaken within it) has developed faster than accompanying theories 
and concepts (Bellamy, 2016, p. 132). He adds that “while the policy 
utility of human security was forthrightly criticised for lacking precise 
definition and for being excessively expansive and vague, practices of 
human security have progressed apace, with the international human pro-
tection regime being only one manifestation” (Bellamy, 2016, p. 113).4 
As an example of the use of human security in policy frameworks, one 
may suggest the Madrid Report of the Study Group on Human Security 
(see also: Chandler, 2008, p. 465; Acharya, Singhdeo, Rajaretnam, 2011, 
pp. 2–3; Mentan, 2014, p. 18).
Regardless of the discussions on the scope and definition of human 
security, there is a broad consensus on the issues that should be consid-
ered in the context of human security. The following are usually men-
tioned: landmines, organized transnational crime, international terrorism, 
small and light weapons, illicit drug trafficking, environmental degra-
4 For more critical voices on the concept of human security and its practical 
meaning see: Paris, 2004; Chandler, 2008; Alkire, 2003.
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dation, infectious diseases (especially HIV/AIDS), poverty, sexual and 
gender-based violence, child victims of armed conflicts, the protection of 
civilians in armed conflicts, refugees and the internally displaced, peace-
building and peacekeeping operations, humanitarian intervention, pun-
ishing international crimes, corporate social responsibility and the role of 
transnational actors (Newman, 2013, pp. 145–146; Ravelona, 2006, p. 5). 
These discussions and definitional dilemmas do not preclude the taking 
of action in the policy field in order to ensure human security in practice.
The above list clearly indicates that human security has legal and po-
litical aspects and is a multidimensional and interdisciplinary research 
problem. The concept of human security is considered a unifying concept 
that combines under one notion various issues. What value does this con-
cept have? Most of these issues, if not all, are not new. Indicating that cer-
tain issues fall under the concept of human security allows one to look at 
them from a new perspective. Moreover, as human rights are individual-
istic, in all of their subsets (civil, political, economic, social and cultural), 
and are also enforced by way of individual petitions to international bod-
ies, human security is of a more collective dimension, encompassing only 
basic human rights and without the mechanism of individual petitions. 
The former are legal norms, whereas the latter are rather a policy concept. 
Still, as such, they are complementary and mutually reinforcing (Estrada-
Tanck, 2017e). Accordingly, individualistic human rights may not be suf-
ficient to protect people globally from structural human rights violations. 
“Human security-inspired policy changes and normative reforms may 
provide widespread solutions to a widespread situation” (Estrada-Tanck, 
2017). Human security provides a framework for actions and sets goals to 
be achieved, and international law serves as a tool for its implementation. 
This is an added value and a reason to pursue it.
We need to understand that we live on the same planet and are all 
mutually interdependent. The security of the entire human race is inter-
dependent – what happens on the other side of the world affects us, like 
a system of connected vessels. We will not be safe until ‘they’ will be, as 
long as there are people who are hungry, tortured, persecuted or arbitrari-
ly imprisoned. The concept of shared responsibility for ensuring human 
security suggests that states are responsible for the security of individuals, 
even when they are outside their jurisdiction. On one hand, this is in con-
tradiction to the basic principle of international law, according to which 
states have obligations to other countries, and not individuals. Despite the 
dynamic development of international human rights law, this statement 
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is rarely questioned (von Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 74). According to this line 
of argument, obligations under agreements on the protection of human 
rights are the commitments of states to other states, and not international 
obligations of states towards individuals that they can assert directly on 
an international level (Berezowski, 1966, p. 26; Cassese, 2005, p. 150). 
Hence, the individual is only the beneficiary of the norm and not the ad-
dressee. On the other hand, human rights have ceased to be an internal 
affair for an individual state, and every state has the right to demand from 
another state respect for the human rights of people falling under the lat-
ter’s jurisdiction, even if they are on territory outside the jurisdiction of 
the former. In this context, the question of humanitarian intervention and 
‘responsibility to protect’ is relevant.
Human security and international law, particularly international hu-
man rights law and international humanitarian law, may be recognized as 
embodying what Alex Bellamy calls “an international human protection 
regime” which comprises “‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures’ […] focused on the protection of individuals and groups from 
the most immediate threats to survival: widespread and systematic arbi-
trary violence” (Bellamy, 2016, p. 113). This claim reflects the trend of 
increasing complementarity between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law (Provost, 2004; Droege, 2007, pp. 332, 
346; Droege, 2008, pp. 501–548; Hampson, 2008, pp. 549–572; Heinze, 
2004; pp. 789–813). Within this regime, human security may be analo-
gized to a strategy or an overarching goal, and international law as a tacti-
cal tool utilized to further the former. In Human Security in Theory and 
Practice, human security has been regarded as a policy tool for analysis, 
explanation and programming of foreign policies and international devel-
opment assistance (Human Security…, p. 12). According to the former 
UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, “[h]uman protection is a subset 
of the more encompassing concept of human security. The latter reminds 
us that the security of ‘we the peoples’ matters every bit as much as the 
security of states. Human protection addresses more immediate threats to 
the survival of individuals and groups” (Ki-Moon, 2011). Hence, interna-
tional law may be used as an instrument contributing to human security, 
and human security as a tool to interpret and develop legal norms.
I will conclude with the words of Cançado Trindade (2010, p. 400): 
“Despite the recurrence of atrocities in the last decades, human conscience 
has reacted in fostering the current process of humanization of Interna-
tional Law. Basic considerations of humanity, nowadays permeating the 
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whole of its corpus juris, constitute yet further indications of the path to 
follow.” This clearly shows that the international legal system does not 
exist for its own sake, and that its ultimate goal is the good, welfare and 
security of human beings, in other words human security.
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Human security, prawa człowieka i prawo międzynarodowe  
– relacje między nimi 
 
Streszczenie
Autorka analizuje związek między prawem międzynarodowym a koncepcją bez-
pieczeństwa ludzkiego, które pojawiła się w latach 90-tych XX wieku. Artykuł jest 
podzielony na trzy części. Część 1 przedstawia pojęcie bezpieczeństwa ludzkiego, 
jego genezę i treść. Część 2 analizuje relacje między bezpieczeństwem ludzkim a pra-
wem międzynarodowym i krótko rozważa najbardziej reprezentatywne aspekty prawa 
międzynarodowego, w tym międzynarodowego orzecznictwa, które w opinii autorki 
odzwierciedlają imperatywy bezpieczeństwa ludzkiego. Wreszcie wnioski końcowe 
dostarczają odpowiedzi na postawione pytania i wskazują na wartość dodaną koncep-
cji bezpieczeństwa ludzkiego. Pytania brzmią następująco: W jaki sposób bezpieczeń-
stwo ludzkie może wzmocnić działania międzynarodowe (działania oparte na prawie 
międzynarodowym)? Gdzie w prawie międzynarodowym odzwierciedlone jest bez-
pieczeństwo ludzkie? Jaka jest rola prawa międzynarodowego dla bezpieczeństwa 
ludzkiego? Biorąc to wszystko pod uwagę, jaka jest wartość dodana przyjęcia kon-
cepcji bezpieczeństwa ludzkiego? Artykuł ten jest nieuchronnie interdyscyplinarny, 
ponieważ łączy perspektywy prawa międzynarodowego i stosunków międzynarodo-
wych. 
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